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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
venting federal invasion of the state legislative function and avoiding
unnecessary federal-state friction. In addition, the Rule represents a
more perfect attempt at cooperative judicial federalism since this con-
cern for state sovereignty is implemented through a hopefully efficient
and simple proceeding. Because the Rule contemplates that the declaratory
judgment action will be instituted directly in the Montana Supreme
Court, many of the delays incident to ordinary abstention orders can
probably be avoided. Since the new Rule cannot be invoked without the
concurrence of the federal court, the parties to the action, and the Mon-
tana Supreme Court, there is little danger it will be used except where
the issue of state law is crucial to the case and the state court determination
can be made without undue delay.55
CONCLUSION
The Montana Rule represents a unique experiment in cooperative
federalism. It should serve as an aid to the federal courts in discharging
their obligation under Erie to follow state law in diversity cases. While
the Rule presents some constitutional complexities and practical perplexi-
ties, most of the objections neglect the existing problems of "absention"
and of authoritatively determining state law in federal litigation. The
new procedure represents a bold step forward in the solution of these
problems. It is presently difficult to ascertain the variety of situations
which may lend themselves to the Rule's application. To a large extent,
this will be determined by the ingenuity of counsel and the cooperation
of the federal and Montana courts.
LAURENCE E. ECK
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW- FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
GIVE UNION THE RIGHT TO HIRE ATTORNEY ON SALARY TO REPRESENT
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CLAIMS OF MEMBERS. The Illinois court en-
joined the United Mine Workers of America from continuing a plan by
which the union hired an attorney on a salary to represent members and
their dependents in claims under the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act.
The union agreed not to interfere with the attorney. Members submitted
forms to the attorney reporting the accident, and the full amount of any
settlement was paid directly to the member or his dependents. Held,
court. It might be noted, however, that if there is no Montana law on a point in
1968, there is little chance of an abundance of state cases on this point in the future.
"On the other hand, from the express language of Rule I an argument might be made
that after the certificate from the federal court has issued, the Montana Supreme
Court has no discretion to refuse rendering a judgment unless there is another
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judgment vacated. Freedom of speech, assembly, and petition guaranteed
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion give the union the right to hire an attorney on a salary to represent
union members. The plan does not constitute unauthorized practice of law.
United Mine Workers of America, District 12 v. Illinois Bar Association,
et al., 88 S.Ct. 353 (1967).
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Cases concerning the unauthorized practice of law can be divided
into two groups: those in which the attorney's qualifications to practice
law are called into question, and those which involve a properly licensed
and qualified attorney who has engaged in a method of practicing law
which may be termed "unauthorized." The attorney employed by the
union in United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar' was properly quali-
fied, but the arrangement was termed "unauthorized" by Illinois courts
because the attorney was employed, not to represent the union, but to
represent individual members of the union.
Until recently, courts in nearly all jurisdictions have prohibited em-
ployment contracts between an attorney and a social or business organiza-
tion for the representation of individual members or employees of the
organization.' The usual ground for invalidating such practices is that
the attorney is engaged in solicitation by having business channeled to
him through the exclusive recommendations of a third party. Such solici-
tation violates the American Bar Association's canons 35 and 47.3
'Hereafter referred to as Mine Workers or instant case.
2For example, see People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Chicago Motor Club, 362
Ill. 50, 199 N.E. 1 (1935); American Automobile Association v. Merrick, 117 F.2d
23 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Cleveland Bar Association v. Fleck, 172 Ohio St. 467, 178 N.E.2d
782 (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 861 (1962); Rhode Island Bar Association v. Auto-
mobile Service Association, 55 R.I. 122, 179 A. 139 (1935).
'Canon 35 was adopted in 1928 and amended in 1933. Canon 47 was adopted in 1937.
The tentative draft of the revised canons of professional ethics is scheduled to appear
in the spring of 1968. To what extent canons 35 and 47 will be changed is not
known at the time of this writing, but the instant case will doubtless be an influence
in favor of their revision. As presently stated, canons 35 and 47 read as follows:
Canon 35. Intermediaries.
The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited
by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and
lawyer. A lawyer's responsibilities and qualifications are individual. He should
avoid all relations which direct the performance of his duties by or in the
interest of such intermediary. A lawyer's relation to his client 'should be
personal, and the responsibility should be direct to the client. Charitable so-
cieties rendering aid to the indigents are not deemed such intermediaries.
A lawyer may accept employment from any organization, such as an asso-
ciation, club or trade organization, to render legal services in any matter in
which the organization, as an entity, is interested, but this employment should
not include the rendering of legal services to the members of such an organ-
ization in respect to their individual affairs.
Canon 47. Aiding the Unauthorized Practice of Law.
No lawyer shall permit his professional service, or his name, to be used
in aid of, or to make possible, the unauthorized practice of law by any lay
agency, personal or corporate.
1968]
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The case against an attorney being hired by al association to represent
individual members of the association was strengthened in 1950 when the
American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Unauthorized Practice
of Law considered the question in general and interpreted the canons as
precluding such arrangements.' The Committee was asked whether a
corporation or union may hire an attorney for the purpose of having him
available, as part of his duties, to advise and assist employees or members
in their personal problems, "such as the drawing of wills, deeds, or leases
for their dwellings, claims against third parties for injuries to person or
property, etc."' The Committee answered that such an arrangement is
a clear violation of canon 35 because the attorney is not rendering legal
services to the organization as an entity.
The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or ex-
ploited by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes
between client and lawyer. If such were permissible, it would per-
mit the corporation or lay agency to do that which the lawyer could
not do; namely, the solicitation of business.
6
Within the last five years, two decisions of the United States Su-
preme Court have led to re-examination of the ethical policies of the
canons in terms of the legal right of individuals to band together to
further their own interests The first was NAACP v. Button8 and the
second, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia
State Bar!
In NAACP v. Button, the Court considered the custom of the NAACP
to pay attorneys of its legal section on a per diem basis to represent in-
dividual members of the organization in court proceedings aimed at pro-
tecting the member's civil rights. Some of those represented by NAACP
attorneys had requested counsel, but it was more common for NAACP
to solicit and urge aggrieved Negroes to allow the attorneys to help them.
The Court held that such a practice was protected by the constitutional
right to associate to pursue legitimate aims,0 and that no compelling state
interest had been shown to justify an infringement of that right. Three
factors influenced the decision of the Court: (1) there was no monetary
stake to tempt the attorney toward disloyalty to the client; (2) the civil
rights litigation in which the NAACP was engaged was vital; and (3)
'ABA Committee on Anauthorized Practice of Law, Opinions, No. A (1950), reported
in 36 A.B.A.J. 677 (1950).
6Id. It should also be noted that the Committee considered the source of the attorney's
remuneration for such services unimportant. Whether he is paid by salary, retainer,
or even paid at all does not matter; the services are rendered "because of the attor-
ney's employment by the corporation [or union], and the vice is that there is a
divided allegiance." Id. at 684.
6Id. at 684.
7U.S. CONST., amend. I: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of
grievances. ' '
8NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
'Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S.
1 (1964).
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there was a scarcity of lawyers willing to undertake such litigation.'
Justices Harlan, Clark, and Stewart dissented on the ground that the liti-
gation program of the NAACP fell within an area of activity which a
state may constitutionally regulate. They insisted that canons 35 and 47,
which the Virginia Supreme Court had adopted in 1938 as rules of court,
should control.
Cases involving labor union plans have come before the courts fre-
quently since it is the nature of unions to foster group activity in aid of
the individual. One court considering a labor union case after Button
distinguished Button on the ground that it applied to litigation seeking
the constitutionally protected ends of the civil rights movement and held
that the state restriction of union counsel plans did not violate the Four-
teenth Amendment." But in 1964 the United States Supreme Court in
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia tipped the balance be-
tween ethical policies and associational rights the other way. The Court
applied the Button doctrine and held that it was proper for the Brother-
hood to recommend particularly qualified lawyers, even if this resulted
in channeling all Union members to them.
The Brotherhood's plan was not new. In 1883 Brotherhood was formed
to promote the welfare of trainmen and their families in a dangerous
occupation.' It was natural for railroad workers to combine their strength
and efforts in the Brotherhood in order to provide insurance and financial
assistance to injured members and to seek safer working conditions. Rail-
road workers were the moving forces that brought about the passage of
the Safety Appliance Act in 1893 and the Federal Employer's Liability
Act of 1908. But simply having these federal statutes on the books was
not enough to assure that the workers would receive the full benefits of
the compensatory damages Congress intended they should have. Injured
workers often fell prey to quick settlement of a persuasive claims adjuster
or to lawyers who were either incompetent to try these lawsuits against
experienced railroad counsel or too willing to settle for a quick dollar.
Under the Brotherhood's plan the nation was divided into sixteen regions.
A lawyer or a firm in each region with a reputation for honesty and
skill in representing plaintiffs in railroad personal injury litigation was
selected to act as Regional Counsel. When a worker was injured or killed,
the secretary of his local lodge would go to him or to his dependents and
recommend that a lawyer be consulted before the claim was settled, and
that in the Brotherhood's judgment the best lawyer to consult was the
counsel selected by it for that area. In 1958, when the Illinois Supreme
Court considered the program," the union attorneys were required to
charge a contingent fee established by the union, advance all costs related
'Id. at 443.
"2 Columbus Bar Association v. Potts, 175 Ohio St. 101, 191 N.E.2d 728 (1963).
'Trainmen v. Virginia, supra note 9, at 2-3. In 1888 the odds against a railroad
brakeman dying a natural death were almost four to one, and the average life ex-
pectancy of a switchman in 1893 was seven years.
"In re Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 13 Ill.2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958).
1968]
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to the disposition of the claim, finance the union's legal aid department,
and compensate local lodge members who investigated accidents and urged
injured members to consult the regional counsel. Although the Illinois
court did not enjoin the program, it did restrict its scope by holding
that the union could not have any financial connection with the attorney,
nor could it fix the fees to be charged.' The union then revised the plan
to eliminate any financial connection between the union and attorney;
but the revised plan was still enjoined in Virginia on the ground that it
resulted in channeling substantially all of the workers' claims to lawyers
chosen by the union.'
In holding that the Trainmen's plan did not constitute the unauthor-
ized practice of law, the United States Supreme Court found that Virginia
had broad powers to regulate the practice of law, but such powers were
not broad enough to foreclose constitutional rights.
17
A State could not, by invoking the power to regulate the professional
conduct of attorneys, infringe in any way the right of individuals or
the public to be fairly represented in lawsuits .... The State can
no more keep these workers from using their cooperative plan to
advise one another than it could use more direct means to bar them
from resorting to the courts to vindicate their legal rights.'8
The factors which induced the Supreme Court's holding in Button
were absent in Trainmen. Trainmen involved only a referral plan with-
out any financial connection between union and attorney, but a dictum
in Trainmen pointed clearly to the issue involved in the instant case:
It is interesting to note that in Great Britain unions do not simply
recommend lawyers to members in need of advice; they retain counsel,
paid by the union, to represent members in personal lawsuits, a prac-
tice similar to that which we upheld in NAACP v. Button.'
MINE WORKERS V. ILLINOIS BAR
The practice involved in the instant case has had a long history.
At the United Mine Worker's 1913 Convention, one year after enact-
ment of the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act, it was reported that
abuses of the Act had already developed: "the interests of the members
were being juggled and even when not, they were required to pay forty
or fifty percent of the amounts recovered in damage suits for attorney's
15Id. at 397-398, 167, 168.
"'Virginia State Bar v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen (Richmond, Va. Ch., Jan.
29, 1962).
"Trainmen v. Virginia, supra note 9, at 6.
"'Id. at 7. It is interesting to note that on remand the Richmond Chancery Court
revised its original decree so as to conform with the Supreme Court's holding, but it
interpreted the holding as protecting only the right to advise and recommend, not
solicitation and commercialization. Virginia State Bar v. Railroad Trainmen, 33 U.S.
Law Week 2387 (Richmond, Va. Ch., Jan. 15, 1965). However, the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals rejected this interpretation, finding that the United States Su-
preme Court had not made any distinction between recommendations and solicitation,
and that consequently both were protected. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v.
Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 207 Va. 182, 149 S.E.2d 265 (1966).
"'See text at note 11, supra.
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fees." In response to this situation the union established its Legal De-
partment by hiring one attorney on a salary to represent members and
their dependents in claims under the Illinois Workmen's Compensation
Act.' Once he is hired, the terms of the attorney's employment are that
he will receive no interference from the union or any of its officers.
Union members are provided with accident forms which are to be filled
out and sent to the union's Legal Department.' From these forms the
attorney prepares his case and sends the claim to the Industrial Commis-
sion. Ordinarily, he does not discuss the claim with the member, but
members understand that he is available for conferences at certain times.
During pre-hearing negotiations, he presents what he believes the claim
to be worth to the attorney for the respondent company and attempts
to settle. If the opposing counsel agree on a settlement, the union at-
torney contacts the injured member to advise him of the offer. If the
member accepts the offer, the transaction is usually complete without
personal contact between attorney and client. If, however, opposing
counsel do not reach agreement or the member rejects the offer, a hear-
ing is held before the Industrial Commission.
An injunction against the Mine Worker's arrangement was granted
by the Circuit Court of Sangamon County. The Illinois Supreme Court
affirmed, ' interpreting Button as protecting "litigation that can be
characterized as a form of political expression,"' and Trainmen as pro-
tecting only referral plans. The United States Supreme Court disagreed,
savine.
We do not think our decisions in Trainmen and Button can be so nar-
rowly limited. We hold that the freedom of speech, assembly, and
petition guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments gives
petitioner the right to hire attorneys on a salary basis to assist its
members in the assertion of their legal rights.'
Even though there is a financial connection between the union and
attorney in Mine Workers, the majority of the court argued that the
temptation to sacrifice the client's best interests was no greater than in
Trainmen.' In both cases there was no indication that the interests of
the union and the member ever actually diverged in an actual lawsuit,
and the interests of the member-client were always fully subserved by
the union plan. Thus, any diminution in high standards of legal ethics
was not sufficiently great to allow infringement of constitutional rights.
The Illinois State Bar Association argued that the union could achieve
nInstant case at 354.
'The present attorney is paid $12,400 per year. He handled more than 400 claims
per year for the union, has a private practice other than Mine Worker's representa-
tion, and was an Illinois state senator.
'Although the forms do not specifically request the attorney to file a claim on behalf
of the injured member, the attorney presumes that the forms constitute such a request.
2'United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar, 35 Ill.2d 112, 219 N.E.2d 503 (1966),
cert. granted 386 U.S. 941 (1967).
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its goals by referring members to a specific lawyer or lawyers, and then
reimburse the members out of a common fund for legal fees paid. The
American Bar Association, in an informal opinion, had approved such an
arrangement.' But the Court held that since the Illinois Supreme Court
had interpreted Trainmen to prohibit a financial connection of any kind
between the union and such attorneys, "it cannot seriously be argued that
this alternative arrangement would be held proper under the laws of
Illinois."' On this point Justice Harlan, the single dissenter in Mine
Workers, disagreed, saying,
The Illinois Supreme Court in this case repeated its statement in
a prior case that a union may properly make known to its members
the names of attorneys it deems capable of handling particular types
of claims. Such union notification would serve to assure union mem-
bers of access to competent lawyers.'
Justice Harlan further argued that the instant case puts the Supreme
Court more deeply than ever in the business of supervising the practice
of law in the various states. In the absence of "demonstrated arbitrary
or discriminatory regulation," he felt that states should be left free to
govern their own Bars without federal interference. Justice Harlan would
have affirmed the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court because (1)
there was no arbitrary or discriminatory state regulation involved, (2)
abuses of the attorney-client relationship were foreseeable under the union
plan, and (3) an acceptable alternative was available which would achieve
the union's goals as well as the present plan.
THE TEST FOR "UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE"
The Supreme Court has used various tests at different times to de-
termine whether the requisite state interest is sufficient to justify regu-
lation of constitutionally protected rights. It has applied the "clear and
present danger" test,' the "bad tendency" test,' and the "absolute" test.'
But by far the most common test, and the one used in Button, Trainmen,
and Mine Workers, is the "balancing" test. Specifically in theses cases,
the balance is between associational rights guaranteed by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments and the state's interest in promoting and main-
taining high standards of professional ethics. In Trainmen the Court said
that the state regulation of constitutionally protected conduct is permis-
sible if a sufficiently compelling state interest is shown.' Thus, the issue
"American Bar Association, Standing Committee on Professional Ethics, 86 A.B.A.
Reports 198 (1961).
'Instant case at 357.
MOId. at 359 (dissenting opinion). Justice Harlan cited United Mine Workers v. Illinois
State Bar, supra note 24, and noted that the earlier Illinois decision referred to was
In re Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, supra note 14.
nSchenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
31Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
3Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 141 (1959, J. Black, dissenting).
31Trainmen v. Virginia, supra note 9, at 1, 6, 8, It is interesting to note that although
Mr. Justice Black is considered an absolutist with respect to First Amendment rights,
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presented to the Court in Mine Workers becomes: Whether a union's
practice of hiring an attorney on salary to represent its members in Work-
men's Compensation cases diminishes the ethical standards of the legal
profession to such an extent as to outweigh the individual right to asso-
ciate with others to assert legal rights.
In his dissent in Mine Workers, Justice Harlan balanced the scales
against associational rights and in favor of the policies expressed in canons
35 and 47. There are two basic arguments in favor of this view: demise
of the attorney-client relationship and commercialization of the legal pro-
fession. The fact that the attorney in Mine Workers does not discuss the
accident with the client prior to filing a claim with the Industrial Com-
mission shows that the demise of the attorney-client relationship is an
actual result of the union's arrangement rather than a theoretical possi-
bility. The arrangement does not promote responsible representation since
the lack of a personal attorney-client relationship increases the likelihood
that the attorney will overlook important facts bearing on the case. Viewed
in another perspective, since the attorney receives the same salary regard-
less of the adequacy of the settlement, he might lack the incentive to devote
extra effort to obtain a better settlement for his client.
Commercialization of the legal profession may also result from the
union's arrangement. The attorney becomes an employee of the union,
mechanically settling a large number of similar claims against one or two
mining companies in the district. Furthermore, the union has an oppor-
tunity to capitalize on these legal services by assessing its members a
greater amount than it pays to the attorney or advertising such legal
services as an inducement for joining the union. A serious abuse could
also result if the union began to exchange individual injury claims in
satisfaction for general employee grievances against the employer. In
return for the employer's agreement to provide better working conditions,
for example, the union might agree to see that the union attorney does
not push the prosecution of a specific injury claim. Such practices would
clearly degrade the legal profession and impair the public's confidence
in it.
To the majority in Mine Workers, abuse of the union's arrangement
was a "distant possibility of harm" which does not justify a "complete
prohibition of the Trainmen's efforts to aid one another in assuring that
each injured member would be justly compensated for his injuries. '" There
are two basic arguments in favor of the balance struck by the majority
of the Court: The plan extends competent legal service to those who
otherwise may be without it; and the associational freedoms involved are
protected by the Constitution. Implicit in the Court's holding in Mine
Workers is the primary duty of the legal profession to serve the public.
While it is true that the union's program in hiring an attorney violates
canons 35 and 47, it is consistent with the purpose of the legal profession
811n=tant case at 356.
1968]
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to provide counsel to all who need it." More central to the majority's
position, however, is the interest in protecting First Amendment freedoms
from even indirect restraints.
The First Amendment would be a hollow promise if it left govern-
ment free to destroy or erode its guarantees by indirect restraints
so long as no law is passed that prohibits free speech, press, petition,
and assembly as such. We have therefore repeatedly held that laws
which actually affect the exercise of these vital rights cannot be
sustained merely because they were enacted for the purpose of
dealing with some evil within the State's legislative competence, or
even because the laws do in fact provide a helpful means of dealing
with such an evil."
For the majority the balance was between First Amendment freedoms
and "distant possibilities of harm." The majority justifies such a posi-
tion by pointing out that "not one single instance of abuse, of harm to
clients, or any actual disadvantage to the public or to the profession" has
resulted in the many years the program has been in operation.'
CONCLUSION
The holding of the Supreme Court in Mine Workers places a union
in an imposing and influential position as the employer of an attorney
whose function- is to represent the personal claims of its individual mem-
bers. Although the record does not show any abuse of the Mine Worker's
plan, serious abuses are foreseeable under such a system. The Supreme
Court has gone beyond the referral arrangement it upheld in Trainmen
and opened a new door to the authorized practice of law by a qualified
attorney. If a union can hire an attorney to represent the personal claims
of its members, should another voluntary association, such as an automobile
club, be allowed to do the same? Is there any limitation on the type of
personal claim which such an attorney could undertake? If a voluntary
association can hire an attorney to represent its members, can a corpora-
tion hire an attorney to represent its employees?
The Button, Trainmen, and Mine Workers decisions have included
within the scope of authorized practice of law arrangements which were
previously unauthorized. Since a new balance must be struck whenever
the competing interests are significantly different, the future scope of
unauthorized practice of law remains uncertain. If the ABA's revised
canons of professional ethics are to set a realistic guideline, they must take
two competing factors into account: (1) the constitutional right of indi-
viduals to band together to seek legal redress, and (2) methods of practicing
law which will insure public confidence in the legal system. In the meaning
of the present canon 35, a lawyer is engaged in solicitation of business
when business is channeled to him through the exclusive recommendations
of a lay intermediary. The methods of practicing law in Button, Trainmen,
T Judge Traynor argues this position in his dissenting opinion in Hildebrand v. Cali-
fornia State Bar, 36 Cal.2d 504, 533, 225 P.2d 508, 519 (1950).
'Instant case at 356. Perhaps the "absolutist" ring of this language is due to the
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and Mine Workers fall within this definition, yet they have been upheld
by the Supreme Court. Since these methods of practicing law are con-
stitutionally protected, does it follow that they are ethical? Will they
help to increase public confidence in the legal profession? The Supreme
Court has not specifically answered these questions in the affirmative;
rather, it has said that such methods cannot be prohibited. It is clear,
nevertheless, that the trend is to narrow "unauthorized" practice of law
by a qualified attorney, and the canons of professional ethics must be
revised to set realistic guidelines for the future scope of authorized
practice.
JAMES P. MURPHY, JR.
INCOME TAXATION - INCORPORATED PROFESSIONAL GROUP TREATED AS A
CORPORATION FOR FEDERAL TAX PURPOSES.-On November 1, 1965, taxpayer,
an attorney, became owner of 10 per cent of the stock in the incorporated'
law firm for which he worked. Subsequently he filed a claim for a tax
refund on that portion of the 10 per cent of the corporation's net earn-
ings for the last two months of 1965 which had not been paid to him in
salary during those two months.2 The United States argued that, despite
a corporate charter, a Treasury Regulation defined such a corporation
to be a partnership and consequently all earnings had to be taxed
directly to the individual.3 The District Court held: (1) Treasury Regula-
tions providing that professional organizations, incorporated or un-
incorporated, could not be taxed as a corporation unless the corporate
characteristics were such that the organization more nearly resembled
a corporation than a partnership were an invalid exercise of a non-
delegable legislative function. (2) Even if the Treasury Regulations
were valid, the professional organization more nearly resembled a
corporation than a partneTship. Empey v. United States, 272 F.Supp. 851
(D.Colo. 1967).
For the purposes of federal taxation all business organizations are
classified as either partnerships 4 or corporations. 5 Consequently, the
definitions of these terms must necessarily be broad enough to accom-
modate those organizations which are neither strictly a partnership nor
a corporation. A partnership includes ". . . a syndicate, group, pool,
joint venture, or other unincorporated organization."6 A corporation in-
'Rule 265, Colo. R. of Civ. Proc.
2The report of the instant case does not contain a summary of facts. Such a summary
may be found in 27 J. Tax. at 270.
4Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1965).
'INT. REV. CODE of 1945, § 7701 (a)(2).
5INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7701 (a)(3).
6INT. REV. CODE of 1954, supra note 4 (emphasis added).
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